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T 
he conception of Camus as primarily a novelist who was in-
clined to dabble in philosophy is an unduly prevalent one. 
However, the acute and particular conception that Camus 
outlines in ‘The Myth of Sisyphus’ of what exactly a novel is 
proceeds directly from that most fundamental and axiomatic realisation 
of all of his philosophy that reality is absurd, and is exemplary of what 
he characterises as an absurd existence. As a description of human re-
ality, with stylisation rather than (speculative) rationalisation as its 
end, all artistic creation constitutes an investing of human life with hu-
man values, an affirmation of existence in spite of the metaphysical 
void. The absurd artist acknowledges the universal futility of both his 
life and his work and chooses to exult in both. Moreover, in recreating 
it to his own design, the artist can make sense of the world in a way that 
the rationalist or scientist never can. Through its artistic depiction, re-
ality is subjugated to the artist’s requirements of order, unity and co-
herence, thus he displays a mastery of his situation. It is fiction above 
all else which constitutes for Camus the epitome of successful living in 
the face of the absurd, embodying in a single act the three foremost ide-
als of revolt, freedom and passion, which are at the heart of absurd life. 
Working on the contention that through his career as a novelist Camus 
is essentially practising his philosophy as he preaches it, this essay ex-
amines Camus’ acclamation of fiction as potentially instructive for both 




 For the absurd man, the necessary dispensing of any notions of 
objective value systems and the exposure of human-ascribed values as 
precisely that has the upshot that everything must now be viewed as 
fundamentally equivalent in an ethical respect. The mood in which pos-
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sibilities of experience are encountered from this impartial viewpoint is 
encapsulated by Meursault‟s unconcerned remark upon being pressed 
by his girlfriend on the subject of marriage; „it‟s all the same to me.‟1 
This obligatory indifference is what gives rise to the peculiar imperative 
of quantity. Having surmised that life in its entirety can find summation 
in the experience contained therein, Camus reasons that the identifica-
tion of that experience as equivalent in value means that the only re-
maining means of evaluation of that life must be in terms of its extent:  
“if I admit my freedom has no meaning except in relation to its limited 
fate, then I must say that what counts is not the best living but the most 
living.”2  Thus the only way that we, as free and responsible beings, can 
truly improve our lives is by pushing its boundaries and broadening its 
scope.  
 This extension of life is, of course, to be taken not in the sense 
of mere existence, but of living to the full; of taking up as many of the 
world‟s offerings as is possible. Essentially „what counts‟ is what Ca-
mus characterises as absurd living:  “Being aware of one‟s life, one‟s 
revolt, one‟s freedom, and to the maximum, is living, and to the maxi-
mum.”3  The absurd man must live with an appreciation of, and appetite 
for, life‟s possibilities, aiming to experience them in as large a quantity 
and as broad a range as possible, and he must do so through lucid and 
responsible choice. That the offerings of the world as artistic pabulum 
should be so numerous and diverse means that the potentialities for art 
are accordingly rich. The artist‟s freedom of choice in artistic creation 
extends to the far reaches of life itself, but as with philosophical under-
standing, can never stretch beyond it.  
 As an object of ontological analysis within the absurd, the proc-
ess of artistic creation reveals the artist in a complex and multifaceted 
relationship with the world and his work. Primarily, it represents the 
living out of an existential choice. In addition to this, artistic creation is 
always aware of itself as a deliberate undertaking. Accordingly, it in-
volves an intellectual effort. Lastly, we can consider the creation itself 
as some kind of new entity within the world (abstract, physical or what-
ever) in that „there is a thing now which was not before‟. Thus the crea-
tive act literally manifests quantity, generating existence along two 
planes. As a choice of living, it is simultaneously passive, conscious 
and prolific. Furthermore, the consciousness of the artist is demanded 
within both of these planes of existence. The engagement of the artist in 
the artistic process is a coincident experience of both the act of creation 
by himself, as artist, and of the created work itself, just as when we ex-
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perience the work as an audience (this is especially obvious with the 
novel) we „inhabit‟ both the familiar and tangible world of our exis-
tence and the artistically fabricated world of imagination. Ricoeur em-
phasizes this amplification of „sense‟ within the novel: 
 
[…] the world which is opened up… by writing is itself also a 
world which has an infinite horizon... Literature creates a 
world of fiction, of possibility, and, consequently, opens up a 
horizon of reality, too. Our sense of reality is multiplied by this 
world of fiction and possibility.4 
 
Yet there is more to it than this. Since all possibilities are viewed as 
objectively equivalent, we may conclude that what is generated in art is 
in fact more of that stuff which comprises life itself: more experience. 
The transient cognitive occupation of a fictional universe through litera-
ture is as legitimate a possibility of existence as any other. “Creation” 
proclaims Camus, “is living doubly.”5 
 The idea of „living‟, however, must be read with all of its ab-
surd implications. Any form of artistic reflection of the world is the re-
flection of it through its creator, and the resulting work can never be so 
easily separated from him. The strength of this involvement is indeed 
such that “the artist commits himself and becomes himself in his 
work.”6 „Commits himself‟ in that the artwork is not only something 
that is generated by the artist, but is an expansion of his own being in 
terms of his intentions, perspectives and ideas. Moreover, it is a record 
of the experience of the artistic process: it is determined by, and embod-
ies, the choices and decisions that the artist makes. „Becomes himself‟ 
in that it is only through this engagement in the artistic process that the 
artist, following his initial choice to be an artist, truly is one. In creat-
ing, he is also self-creating. This idea is shrewdly articulated in Robert 
Cumming‟s examination of Sartre‟s aesthetic position: 
 
[…] the structure of the work of art embodies what the artist is 
conscious of, but since his consciousness has been inherently 
articulative and selective in its constructive activity, the struc-
ture of the work of art is also a structure of decisions, whose 
interrelationship composes the artist‟s “choice of himself.” … 
the work of art is implicitly a self-portrait.7 
 
Thus the discrimination involved in all artistic creation entails a sort of 
second order existential choice. The artist defines himself by making 
concrete certain possibilities, both in his choice of himself as artist, and 
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within the art itself. He is existing twice, and bearing his freedom re-




 It is not difficult to see why Camus esteems fiction in particular 
as the greatest of all art forms. In fact, absurd fiction is exalted as a 
paradigm of absurd living and an exemplary manifestation of all the 
virtues that he ascribes to art as an absurd choice. An obvious prelimi-
nary observation is that in using language as its medium, fiction cannot 
fail to be overtly mimetic of reality.8 Language is not only our prime 
method of communication as human beings, but its very function is to 
express to us our world and our situation. As a means of human repre-
sentation, language is paramount. Whilst music or dance may often 
seem perfectly suited to conveying emotion, abstract painting can seem 
to transcend conventional temporal restrictions, and photography‟s re-
production of the visual world is unmatched in its capacity for accu-
racy, the overall expressive capabilities of each is nonetheless severely 
restricted in comparison to literature. Even theatre (which as a literary 
creation employs many similar techniques and devices) is still compara-
tively limited in its representative capacities by its necessary structure 
of action. The novel, on the other hand, can conceive of entire uni-
verses. As such, the craftsmanship involved in the writing of a novel 
exemplifies artistically the ideal of quantity that Camus prescribes as a 
universal ethic for life under the absurd. Fiction, in representing the 
artist‟s situation, can represent it more fully than any other art form. It 
is a bigger, more comprehensive description of the world. 
 With such an inclusive diversity of aspect, the affirmation of 
the novelist is accordingly immense. In addition, this extensiveness of 
the novel above other art forms is also applicable to the revision of real-
ity being proposed. Therefore the converse role of art as revolt is again 
magnified in fiction. Revolt is also inherently present in language by 
virtue of the organisation and coherence of its construction. Merely to 
speak is to impose a form of human order on an orderless world, to 
force it to conform to our requirements of understanding. Language is 
already a triumph in making human sense of the world. Of course the 
structural discipline of the novel extends far beyond its lingual sub-
stance; this in turn is bound by a skeletal literary structure which en-
compasses such elements as form, a temporal framework and the impo-
sition of boundaries (chapters, divisions, the beginning and end of the 
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book etc.). Yoseph Milman notes that the traditional tripartite structure 
of the fictional narrative as background, characters and plot corresponds 
directly to the “three principle aspects of the world” where the feeling 
of the absurd is most prevalent, that is respectively “the ontological (the 
nature of objects or „things‟), the psychological (man‟s nature, feelings 
and motivations) and the existential (the purpose of human action and 
the meaning and value of life).”9 Thus the novel is fundamentally suited 
to absurd expression.  
 In choosing to write, the absurd novelist has already demon-
strated a certain moral resolve. He has exercised his freedom in choos-
ing, and in choosing to choose, his revolt against the apparent meaning-
lessness of his choice and his passion in his desire to create. Every ab-
surd virtue that is manifested in the novel requires a conscious decision 
of the writer. That the artist must remain perpetually acutely aware of 
the futility of his task is merely a subsidiary upshot of his absurd con-
sciousness, and yet still the effort of regarding his labours with a hum-
ble acceptance of their gratuity requires a moral discipline of admirable 
proportions. It is precisely this disciplined acceptance on the part of the 
artist which inspires that dynamic affirmation and denial of reality in 
fiction that operates at the very core of its being:  
 
Art can never be so well served as by a negative thought. Its 
dark and humiliated proceedings are as necessary to the under-
standing of a great work of art as black is to white… Perform-
ing these two tasks simultaneously, negating on the one hand 
and magnifying on the other, is the way open to the absurd 
creator. He must give the void its colours.10 
 
Even as an embodiment of a universally human ethical struggle, fiction 
is nonetheless always a personal undertaking of the writer and an ex-
pression of his individual revolt against his situation. 
 As the possibility of living in which man, in his extreme expo-
sure to the absurd, feels most severely its exacting cries for integrity, 
artistic creation is also the one in which he is most keenly attuned to his 
unadorned existence in the world:  
 
Of all the schools of patience and lucidity, creation is the most 
effective. It is also the staggering evidence of man‟s sole dig-
nity: the dogged revolt against his condition, perseverance in 
an effort considered sterile. It calls for a daily effort, self-
mastery, a precise estimate of the limits of truth, measure and 
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strength. It constitutes an ascesis. All that „for nothing‟ in order 
to repeat and mark time. But perhaps the great work of art has 
less importance in itself than in the ordeal it demands of a man 
and the opportunity with which it provides him of overcoming 
his phantoms and approaching a little closer to his naked real-
ity.11 
 
Thus artistic creation, and fiction particularly, is a deeply profound and 
enriching experience for the artist. Yet it is not only within the personal 




 I earlier identified fictional creation as exemplifying the quanti-
tative ethic and in doing so highlighted the dual relationship of possibil-
ity concerning the artist and his work. As a finished product, standing 
on its own and subject to interpretation, the novel still incorporates this 
duality of possibility; firstly as the product of (and a documentation of) 
the creative process, and secondly as a possibility of further experience 
in virtue of its communicative abilities. This second possibility now 
stands in relation to the reader. If fiction adheres to the constraints of 
the absurd, then the involvement of the reader within its conceptual 
world will in many instances constitute an exploration of absurd possi-
bilities. Through the inhabitation of a fictional universe, both the writer 
and the reader are able to explore hitherto personally unchartered ave-
nues of absurd reality through the fictional narrative. The hypothetical, 
conceptual nature of the novel, coupled with its conspicuously phe-
nomenological character, means that it can act as instructive by allow-
ing one to experience something in the reading or writing of it that 
would be unattainable in the „real‟ world.12 Thus Camus praises the 
classical French novel for its persistent yet disciplined pursuit of pas-
sions to their limit: “they teach us the mathematics of destiny which are 
a means of freeing ourselves from it.”13 If there is a sense in which the 
absurd novel may be said to act as a means of escapism for the deluded 
reader, it is by enabling him to assume, through the use of imagination, 
an alternative perspective, to extricate himself from the network of in-
volvements which constitutes his usual world of experience.14  
 Whilst in life we are constantly confronted with an often indis-
tinct and confused variety of representations, the absurd novel provides 
us with a purer view of the world. Thus, as with phenomenology, in 
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representing to us authentically our absurd situation, literature allows us 
to reach a clearer understanding of it. The elucidatory advantages of 
assuming the sort of perspective whereby we are not implicated within 
our familiar world is excellently illustrated by Joseph Fell‟s image of 
the astronaut, whose accomplishment of a vast distance from his usual 
worldly perspective is quite literal. From faraway, he is able to see this 
world “within a part of which we are usually preoccupied, as a whole, 
standing out in isolation against a field of black and empty nothing-
ness.”15 The astronaut, in his lonely capsule, must feel keenly his help-
lessness in relation to the affairs of the world that he surveys. Yet upon 
his return to earth he may still retain an acute alertness to the contextual 
scope of his own existence. Such is the observational position of the 
reader of the novel, who in assuming the perspective of a helpless spec-
tator, quite detached from his usual situation, is thus able to view it with 
a fullness and lucidity which he would not usually attain. Yet this lucid-
ity may persist upon his disengagement from this position. It is in this 
way that absurd literature is conducive to an absurd sensibility. 
 With regard to the first of the novel‟s instantiations of experi-
ence, I have already intimated certain ways in which the novel is exem-
plary of the demands of revolt, freedom and passion which configure 
life in the face of the absurd. Fiction, declares Camus, should be “that 
exercise in detachment and passion which crowns the splendour and 
futility of a man‟s life.”16 It is discernible that a glance to fiction as de-
monstrative of these ethical principles may be instructive for our behav-
iour in this regard. There are yet other ways in which the absurd novel 
may serve as an object lesson for absurd life. The apprehension and 
manipulation of reality in absurd fiction is a model instance of the valid 
imposition of a structure on randomness. We can learn from the way in 
which it faces reality head on, embracing it in all its chaos; its readiness 
to challenge its situation; its attention to life and its control over it. 
“This art”, affirms Camus, “is… born of an infinite possibility of suffer-
ing and of a firm decision to master this suffering by means of lan-
guage.”17 The efficacy of the novel in its apprehension of the tools at 
our disposal is similarly estimable. As an exploration of, and creative 
use of, its artistic medium, it is effectively “giving man, in his struggle 
against destiny, the powers of language.”18 The simultaneous solitari-
ness and solidarity of the novel, in both evoking the personal revolt and 
perspectives of its author, and at the same time being the „public‟ prod-
uct of a time and culture, is an actual reconciliation of the artist‟s per-
sonal struggle and revolt with his naturally social existence. Further-
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more, as a communicative phenomenon, the novel objectifies the ab-
stract element of discursive relations between human beings. Its dual 
nature as at once both textually fixed, the product of its author, and an 
abstract focus of subjective interpretation, makes explicit the conflict of 
intentions that is characteristic of all discourse. 
 It has already been noted that in his imaginative engagement 
with the text, the reader is provided with an unusual opportunity of dis-
entangling himself from the network of involvements which constitutes 
his usual world of experience, and thus of seeing the world from an 
atypical perspective. However, we must not forget the novel‟s identity 
as the intentional product of its author. The relationship between the 
three entities involved is essentially a discursive one, with the novel 
functioning as the intermediary abstract element of the conversation, 
but bound by the static physicality of the text. But the dialogue has only 
one direction. It is a transmission of suggestion from the novelist to his 
reader. In entering cognitively into the immaterial realm of the narrative 
the reader is able to survey the fictional world from within, and in doing 
so is invited to take up its perspectives; not only as a transient observer, 
but also as an individual: as the reader. The novel is never innocent of 
suggestion. Just as the artist cannot help but get caught up in his work, 
to the extent that he „commits himself‟ within it by means of his inten-
tions, discriminations, actions, and so forth, so this involvement may 
carry over into the reader‟s own life. The distinctions between the pos-
sibilities of experience of the fictional world and of the „real‟ world be-
gin to blur as the reader, as essentially a „trans-world‟ consciousness, 
starts to become susceptible to the ideas contained within the novel. Of 
course the absurd novel, by definition, will not contain any semblance 
of argument, but to commend the description as pure is not to say that it 
is not opinionated. As the product of choice and discrimination, the 
novel is always representative of a particular perspective. Just as phe-
nomenology claims to discover philosophy in any aspect of experience, 
so the novel can put forward a case without actually stating it. 
 This peculiar persuasive character of the novel, its facility to 
provide a means by which the writer may collude with the reader in 
understanding reality, makes it particularly suited to the sort of curious, 
investigative approach that Camus, as a firm disciple of the Copernican 
turn, characteristically employs. His philosophy is not done from 
„outside‟ of life, as it were, but takes as its perspective that phenome-
nological of one within human existence. It first realises itself as a prod-
uct of the human situation - that of thrownness in the world - and then 
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starts to inquisitively explore within it, making observations and taking 
notes as it does, until it recognises that it has reached its limit. Having 
reached this limit, it reassesses its situation in light of its observations, 
and draws the appropriate conclusions. As Merleau-Ponty in his charac-
terisation of phenomenology explains, “the only pre-existent Logos is 
the world itself… the philosophy which brings it into visible existence 
does not begin by being possible; it is actual or real like the world of 
which it is a part.”19 Similarly, the novel does not confront the reader 
with a view of things, but rather lays it out around the reader for the 
reader to explore for himself. It engages the reader within its midst 
through its characters and its narrative, and in doing so gives the reader 
an idea of what its like to be within a certain world; a world that it is 
constructed with the ideas of the novelist. Despite his denial of its perti-
nence to such „existentialist philosophers‟, the standpoint from which 
the absurd is recognised and presented very much resembles David 
Wiggins‟ characterisation of the „participant perspective‟ which “can 
contain together both the perception of incongruity and a nice apprecia-
tion of the limited but not necessarily infinitesimal importance of this or 
that particular object of concern.”20 It is a matter of „zooming out‟; of 
adopting a perspective that is so detached from the absorbing world of 
everyday concerns of artificial significance, that they can be seen within 
the vast context of metaphysical nullity, and our focus on them thus 
farcical in its disproportionateness. However, the perspective is never 
so detached as to be removed from the world it is reviewing; the consid-
erations are not considered as separate or incompatible.  
 By including the reader imaginatively within the ideational 
schema and thus allowing him an opportunity of experience of the ideas 
being proposed, the novel may bring the reader to acknowledge them in 
a way that he perhaps otherwise could not, or may naturally resist. This 
proposition is explored in depth by Cora Diamond, who advocates the 
notion of non-argumentative „convincing‟ by just such an imaginative 
„appeal to our intelligence‟ as is effected in the novel, within the con-
text of moral philosophy. She does so on the basis that it is exactly 
these sorts of imaginative capacities, as are employed by fiction, that 
we naturally use in our moral self-definition. Similarly, Camus‟ phi-
losophy, as a working through of absurd implications, is characterised 
by its concern with what it now means to be a human being: how we 
can, how we should, and why we should live. The Myth of Sisyphus fa-
mously opens with the question of suicide: “Judging whether life is or 
is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of 
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philosophy.”21 Practically, to judge whether life is worth living amounts 
to an exploration of what it is to live. The Myth of Sisyphus gives a phi-
losophical answer to a philosophical question, but as to providing an 
account of life, it is far from complete, and is thus perhaps better con-
ceived as the laying down of the format in which the study is to be con-
ducted. Camus‟ expansion of his writing style to the novel is effectively 
an assertion that the traditional format of philosophical inquiry (the es-
say, the argument, the critical text) is inadequate for his purposes. It is a 
progressive accommodation of, and appreciation for, the shrewd, and 
yet quite blatant observation that “(w)e get into the habit of living be-
fore acquiring the habit of thinking.”22 It is an extension of philosophy‟s 
methodology to the descriptive realm of artistic creation, a vital devel-
opment of its scope. Such an extension allows it not only a better access 
to those areas of its concern that Camus identifies as elemental to its 
task, but more significantly, a better means of communicating those 
ideas.23 The erroneousness of the common categorisation of Camus as 
“a novelist with a strong philosophical bent.”24 is effectively summed 
up by a judicious remark of Wittgenstein‟s: “People nowadays think 
that scientists exist to instruct them, poets, musicians, etc. to give them 
pleasure. The idea that these have something to teach them - that does 
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mus‘ demand that art must always remain within the parame-
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ters of description and not attempt to explain the world  is a 
direct outcome of that most rudimentary and foundational 
observation of all of Camus‘ philosophy that ‗as human be-
ings, we are simply not equipped to deal with the world from 
outside of the scope in which it exists.‘ The avowal of the ab-
surd man to confine himself to description stems from the 
same motive as that of phenomenology: a denial of the justifi-
cation of any other means. It aims to derive its account of real-
ity from the only possible source of human experience, but at 
a point before human explanation impairs reasonable analysis. 
An explicit discussion of the resemblances of an absurd life 
and phenomenology occurs in ‗Philosophical Suicide‘ within 
the Chapter ‗An Absurd Reasoning‘ in ‗The Myth of Sisy-
phus‘, although as the title suggests, the subject is broached 
within the context of Husserl‘s philosophy with the intent of 
exposing its shortcomings in relation to an absurd philosophy. 
9. Yoseph Milman, Opacity in the writings of Robbe-Grillet, Pinter 
and Zach – A Study in the Poetics of Absurd Literature, p.11. 
10. The Myth of Sisyphus, p. 103. 
11. The Myth of Sisyphus, p.104. 
12. Indeed, Camus frequently uses fictional characters to explore 
absurd possibilities. Fiction is a perfect context for an explo-
ration of the full implications of living the absurd life, as it 
involves fictional consequences. For example, Meursault, in 
The Outsider, becomes a martyr for the absurd. Similarly, each 
of Camus‘ examples of ‗the absurd man‘ is drawn from litera-
ture (Don Juan, Sisyphus etc.). It is easy to see how it might 
be easier to attribute a certain consistency of virtues to a fic-
tional life than to assimilate those virtues into one‘s own life. 
13. Intelligence and the Scaffold, p.159. 
14. To employ a Heideggerian characterisation of what is essen-
tially the human perspective. 
15. Joseph Fell, Heidegger and Sartre: An Essay on Being and Place, 
p.108. 
16. The Myth of Sisyphus, p.94. 
17. Intelligence and the Scaffold, p.157. 
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20. David Wiggins, ‗Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life‘ in 
Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value, p.114. 
21. The Myth of Sisyphus, p.11. 
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23. ‗More significantly‘ because the first achievement of the 
novel as philosophy, as we have seen, mirrors the achieve-
ment of phenomenology in assuming a descriptive methodol-
ogy, and because the communication of ideas is, in practice, 
of equal importance to any discipline as the occurrence of 
those ideas. 
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